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Abstract—High tech strategies such as Industry 4.0 and Smart
Manufacturing require industrial devices to be connected to
the Internet. This movement towards interconnected industrial
devices poses significant security risks as confidential data must
be transferred and stored using untrustworthy channels and
cloud servers. End-to-end private key cryptography is suitable
to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of data.
However, private key cryptography has some drawbacks such
as the so-called key distribution problem. A possible solution,
factory installed keys, are untrustworthy as the two partners
relying on end-to-end cryptography can not be sure that no
other party is in possession of the used keys. To overcome these
problems, the Bring Your Own Key (BYOK) principle based
on Near Field Communication (NFC) and dedicated secured
hardware is presented in this paper.
Index Terms—Near Field Communication; Industrial Internet
of Things; Industry 4.0; cryptography; keys; security controller.
I. INTRODUCTION
The growth of the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is
driven by initiatives such as Industry 4.0 [1], Smart Manufac-
turing [2] or Cloud Manufacturing [3]. All of these initiatives
promote the connection of production relevant devices to the
Internet to quickly respond to changing customer demands,
making them so-called smart factories [4]. Data in such smart
factories does not only need to be transferred internally, but
also to external partners to increase operational efficiency.
Smart factories aim at increasing the operational efficiency
through (i) minimizing unplanned downtime of production
relevant equipment, (ii) improving the supply chain efficiency,
To decrease downtimes, the necessary maintenance, re-
pair, and operations (MRO) schedules need to be optimized.
Maintenance providers, for example, device vendords need
to collect and analyze data such as equipment condition or
operating hours [5] in order to predict optimal MRO schedules.
To increase supply chain efficiency, it is crucial to use
Internet technologies and business-to-business supply chain
applications [6]. In an IIoT context this includes the trans-
mission of production data directly to suppliers such that the
overhead of supply chain management can be minimized.
To be able to optimally monitor and control the internal
production flow, a suitable smart factory architecture as well
as protocols need to be chosen. A possible IoT protocol that
is also suitable for industrial use cases is the Message Queue
Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol that was designed for
lightweight machine-to-machine communication [7]. MQTT
is based on the publish/subscribe principle and through its
architecture it is possible to transport data to internal as well
as external partners such as maintenance providers [8].
In order to be able to transfer data to external communi-
cation partners such as maintenance providers and suppliers
as well as to arbitrary internal devices, an MQTT broker that
is connected to the Internet or even hosted by a third party
can be used. In any case, the transport of confidential and
production relevant information through the Internet requires
the usage of appropriate cryptographic methods such as end-
to-end encryption using TLS.
End-to-end encryption relying on asymmetric cryptography
is infeasible for larger amounts of data; therefore, symmetric
key cryptography needs to be used. Symmetric cryptography
requires both the sender and receiver of the data to be
in possession of the same shared key. Because no direct
connection between sender and receiver can be established
in protocols such as MQTT, key exchange algorithms such
as Diffie-Hellman can not be used; a key distribution problem
results from this scenario. A device vendor that is in possession
of factory installed keys would need to distribute these keys
to the equipment customer, who then would need to distribute
some of these keys to its suppliers in a scenario such as
illustrated in Fig. 1. Moreover, in such a scenario the device
vendor would need to be trusted to securely and trustworthy
handle all keys. For instance, if the device vendor would be
selling devices to competing companies in the same business
field, the device vendor would be in possession of keys that
could be used for industrial espionage.
To mitigate these key related issues, we propose to apply the
Bring Your Own Key (BYOK) principle. Using this principle,
keys necessary for end-to-end encryption can be changed
by device owners. For example, in the scenario illustrated
in Fig. 1, the keys used to protect production relevant data
can be changed such that the device vendor is no longer
in possession of decryption keys for production data. To
allow keys to be deployed and updated in a secured but
intuitive manner, we present an NFC based approach that
also uses dedicated security controllers (SC) to increase the
security of our approach. To the best knowledge of the authors,
no such approach was presented previously. Therefore, the
contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We present a scenario in that the BYOK principle is ap-
plied to solve the problems arising from key distribution
and trust issues in factory deployed keys.
• We present a secured and NFC based interface for IIoT
devices to deploy and change keys.
• The presented NFC extension for IIoT devices is suitable
for new devices and legacy devices alike.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. All
involved technologies as well as related work to the BYOK
principle are discussed in Section II. In Section III, our
approach to change keys in an IIoT context is presented.
The security implications of the proposed BYOK approach
for manufacturing devices are then analyzed by means of a
threat analysis in Section IV. A prototypical implementation
of our approach is shown in Section V. In Section VI this
paper is concluded and possible future work is discussed.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Near Field Communication (NFC)
NFC is a wireless communication technique that is based
on a subset of radio-frequency identification (RFID) standards.
Because NFC is based on RFID standards, NFC devices
are compatible with existing RFID cards and tags [9]. NFC
technology is based on inductive coupling and operates at a
radio frequency of 13.56 MHz up to a range of approximately
10 centimeters with bit rates up to 848 kbits per second [10].
Connecting NFC devices is fundamentaly different than other
technologies such as WiFi, Bluetooth or ZigBee. Two devices
automatically establish an NFC connection if they are brought
near to each other. Thus, connections need to be (i) actively
initiated by a human operator and (ii) the operator typically
needs to be in close proximity to the devices. On the one hand,
NFC offers security advantages compared to other wireless
technologies [11] because of these properties. On the other
hand, bringing one device near to another to transfer data is
an easy and intuitive principle for humans [12]. In addition,
NFC devices can be operated in passive mode which allows
NFC devices such as tags or contactless cards to be operated
without a battery or power supply [13].
NFC is seen as a promising IoT technology that will link
the real world with the digital world [14]. Nowadays, NFC (or
RFID) is already used for a wide range of applications, the
most prominent being the mobile payment sector [15]–[17].
Other application domains of NFC include ticketing [18]–[20],
healthcare [21]–[23], or pairing of wireless devices [24], [25].
B. Authenticated Encryption (AE)
AE combines symmetric cryptography with Message Au-
thentication Codes (MAC) in a secured way such that data
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity can be provided [30].
Symmetric cryptography relies on a shared key for encryption
and decryption of data [31]. In our presented approach, the Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) is used that is considered to
be cryptographically secure using keylenghts of 256 bit [32].
TABLE I
COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORK
Work Method Remark
[24]–[26] Pairing of wirelessdevices
Approaches provide no or only weak
security as information for device pair-





Proposed method for EAP-TLS enabled
smart cards. This approach is not suit-





Internet access necessary which might
not be possible in all industrial settings.
Also, man-in-the-middle attacks could
be performed on gateway.
Our
approach
NFC device for se-
cured key transport
Security properties discussed in threat
analysis.
As MAC algorithm, a keyed-hash message authentication code
(HMAC) [33] based on SHA-256 is used.
C. Security Controller (SC)
In our presented approach SC are used to offer a protected
processing environment as well as secured storage for the
transferred keys. SC can be embedded into systems similar
to traditional processing units [34]. The property that dis-
tinguishes SC from conventional processing units is tamper
resistance [35]. SC that provide tamper resistance mitigate
physical attacks by using appropriate countermeasures that
are tested by the Common Criteria (CC) for Information
Technology Security Evaluation [36].
D. Bring Your Own Key (BYOK)
The BYOK principle originated from the Bring Your Own
Device (BYOD) idea that allowed employees to use their own
mobile phones, tablets and laptops in company networks [37].
These devices need to be secured such that they can be trusted
to access a company’s confidential data [38].
Similar to BYOD, the BYOK principle allows own keys
to be used for cryptographic operations [39], [40]. BYOK is
mostly associated with cloud computing, where data is end-
to-end encrypted using keys provided by the customer. If in
addition to keys also cryptographic methods are provided by a
customer, the BYOK principle is extended to Bring Your Own
Encryption (BYOE) [41].
The establishment of an end-to-end secured channel using
keys provided by a BYOK method could be interpreted as
a device pairing process as well. The pairing of wireless
devices is often assisted by NFC technology [24]–[26]. Urien
et al. [27] present an approach to securely exchange tokens
between smart cards used in prepayment contexts. Related
to keys, Urien and Kiennert [28], [29] introduce an NFC
based system to update access authorizations of RFID locks.
In their approach they use Android mobile phones to establish
a Internet connection via NFC that is used to download keys
from a key server to the RFID lock. The Internet connection























Fig. 1. Example of a smart factory with various publishers and subsribers of data, as envisioned in the Industry 4.0 initiative.
no configuration device tailored for IIoT use cases without
network capabilities can be utilized. An overview of related
work compared to our presented approach is given in Table I.
III. BRING YOUR OWN KEY
In general, the keys that are deployed using the BYOK
principle need to be generated first. We propose two different
scenarios to generate keys, depending on the trustworthiness of
the used mobile device and the corresponding operator. Both
scenarios are shown in Fig. 2.
1) If the mobile device and/or the personnel deploying
keys are considered untrustworthy, keys are generated
at a backend. The key material is then encrypted and
transferred to the mobile device, from where the keys
can be deployed at the manufacturing devices and the
corresponding connection partners. The keys are pro-
tected from being extracted and used by an adversary
due to the applied encryption.
2) If the mobile device and the personnel deploying keys
are considered trustworthy, keys can be generated and
encrypted directly at the mobile device. The key material
then needs to be transferred to the manufacturing device
and the corresponding connection partners.
NFC technology is used to transfer key material between
devices in our approach. However, NFC does not provide
cryptographic protection for transferred data. Therefore, we
protect keys transferred in our NFC based BYOK approach by
using AE to provide confidentiality, integrity and authenticity





Fig. 2. Deploying new keys at manufacturing device and backend. The keys
are either generated at the backend or at the mobile device itself.
AE, an initial key needs to be defined. If this is done by the
equipment vendor, these key needs to be send to the equipment
customer using a trusted channel. The equipment customer









Fig. 3. NDEF Record containing a single transferred key protected using AE.
equipment from the vendor using the BYOK approach. Thus,
the device customer is able to take control of their hardware.
New keys protected by AE are transferred to the manufacturing
equipment using NFC and the NFC Data Exchange Format
(NDEF). NDEF packets can contain a number of NDEF
Records that contain the actual data. In our approach, a
single NDEF Record (see Fig. 3) contains the required header
information as well as a cipher spec, the encrypted key and the
MAC resulting from the AE encryption process. The cipher
spec field contains information on which algorithms to use
for decryption and MAC calculation. Encrypted key and MAC
are sent sequentially, because the encrypt-then-MAC mode of
operation was selected by us due to its security properties [42].
We propose the hardware extension for IIoT devices shown
in Fig. 4, to provide the required NFC functionality as well as
secured storage and execution environments for manufacturing
devices. A host controller is used to connect manufacturing
devices to the Internet by providing interfaces to the manu-
facturing device itself as well as to the Internet. In addition to
that host controller, we propose to include a SC that provides
an NFC interface as well as tamper resistance. The NFC
interface is used to transfer keys from the mobile device to
the manufacturing device. In addition to that, the SC can
be powered through the NFC field, such that keys can be
exchanged even if the manufacturing device is not connected
to any power supply. The transferred keys are then decrypted
and securely stored in the SC’s memory that provides tamper
resistance. Thus, it is infeasible for adversaries to extract keys
transferred to and stored at the manufacturing device. The
SC further provides tamper resistance for the cryptographic
operations necessary during end-to-end encrypted data transfer
via the Internet.
IV. THREAT ANALYSIS
A threat analysis [43] was conducted to highlight security
features and to demonstrate the achieved security level of
our presented BYOK approach. This threat analysis lists all
involved Entities (E), Assets (A) that need to be protected,
and Threats (T) resulting from our BYOK approach as well as
Countermeasures (C), Residual Risks (R) and Assumptions
(As) regarding the threats. For all involved entities, assump-
tions regarding their trustworthiness are made.
• (E1) Device Vendor: (As1) assumed honest but curious
• (E2) SC Vendor: (As2) assumed trustworthy

















Fig. 4. BOYK enhancement providing interfaces to manufacturing device,
the Internet and the mobile device used for key deployment.
• (E4) External Communication Partners (e.g. Supplier):
(As4) assumed trustworthy
• (E5) Hoster for Broker: (As5) assumed untrustworthy
• (E6) Person deploying Key: (As6) assumed untrustworthy
• (E7) Arbitrary Adversary: (As7) assumed to be able to
conduct online and physical attacks
After all entities and the corresponding assumptions are
identified, the assets that need to be protected are determined.
• (A1) Encrypted Data: The data that is confidential and
thus transferred secured by some key.
• (A2) Keys: All keys that are stored at any instance in the
BYOK process. Loss of a key would result in a loss of
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of (A1).
• (A3) Device Functionality: A BYOK interface that is
integrated into IIoT devices must not threaten the func-
tionality of these devices in any way. If an adversary is
able to harm the functionality of an IIoT device, physical
entities and even human lives are threatened.
Considering all identified entities, assumptions, and assets,
our presented BYOK approach can now be reviewed concern-
ing potential threats. For each threat, we are going to list
countermeasures and/or residual risks if a threat can not be
mitigated. For each threat, the involved entities as well as the
affected assets are listed as well.
• (T1) Intentional or unintentional backdoors in device.
Entities/Assets: (E1), (E2); (A1), (A2), (A3)
(C1) Threats investigated in CC EAL5+ certification
process for the SC included in involved devices.
• (T2) Weak or buggy cryptography.
Entities/Assets: (E1), (E2); (A1), (A2), (A3)
(C2) Threats investigated in CC EAL5+ certification
process for the SC included in involved devices.
• (T3) Device vendor loses or distributes keys.
Entities/Assets: (E1); (A1), (A2), (A3)
(C3) Initial keys are changed through BYOK approach.
Device vendor does not own actually used keys.
• (T4) Malicious mobile device or personnel.
Entities/Assets: (E6); (A1), (A2), (A3)
(C4) Key material is transported protected by AE, if
personnel and/or device are assumed to be untrustworthy.
• (T5) Wrong keys deployed.
Entities/Assets: (E6); (A3)
(R1) A malicious user that deploys wrong keys or does
not update keys and thus attacks communication between
devices is similar to a DoS attack that can not be
mitigated by our approach.
• (T6) Device owner does not change initial keys, uses weak
keys or loses keys in a security breach.
Entities/Assets: (E3); (A1), (A2), (A3)
(R2) Malicious behaviour by the device owner can not
be mitigated by our approach.
• (T7) Remote attacks targeting IIoT devices.
Entities/Assets: (E7); (A1), (A2), (A3)
(C5) Due to the short communication range of NFC,
remote attacks are limited to attackers having physical
access to a smart factory.
(C6) An adversary that is able to communicate using the
NFC interface is still not able to apply keys because the
encryption key is kept private by the device owner.
(C7) To mitigate the problem of eavesdropping that is
still possible for any wireless technology, the transferred
keys are protected using AE.
• (T8) Physical attacks targeting IIoT devices.
Entities/Assets: (E7); (A1), (A2), (A3)
(C8) Due to the SC providing tamper resistance, extract-
ing key material is considered infeasible for adversaries.
• (T9) DoS attack using BYOK interface.
Entities/Assets: (E7); (A3)
(C9) Traditional DoS attacks using the BYOK interface
are mitigated by the limited bit rate of NFC and the SC
handling all involved cryptographic methods. Thus, the
whole computational effort will be handled by the SC.
V. PROTOTYPE
A prototypical implementation of an end-to-end encrypted
data transfer relying on keys provided through our presented
BYOK enhancement was implemented to demonstrate the
functionality, feasibility and usability of our approach. The
setup consists of a mboile device and three Raspberry PI
3, representing a manufacturing device equipped with our
BYOK enhancement, a broker and a subscriber respectively
as shown in Fig. 5. Similar to the scenario shown in Fig. 1,
the manufacturing device is connected to the smart factory’s
internal network (blue network cable) while the MQTT broker
and the supplier are in an external network (yellow network
cable). The used mobile device is a Nexus S smart phone with
Android 4.1.2 Jelly Bean installed. The BYOK enhancement
comprises the following components:
• The used host controller is an Infineon XMC4500 micro-
controller from the Cortex M4 family that offers various
connection interfaces such as USB, I2C and Ethernet.
• The SC is connected via I2C to the host controller. In
our prototype we used an Infineon SLE78 that is CC










Fig. 5. Prototype setup using a Nexus S mobile device and three Raspberry
PI 3, as well as our proposed BYOK enhancement.
NFC interface that is able to power the SC and connected
devices such as sensors through the NFC field emitted by
active NFC devices.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have shown how to apply the BYOK prin-
ciple to mitigate key related problems arising in the IIoT. This
principle, usually applied in cloud computing scenarios, assists
in establishing end-to-end encrypted data transfers using IoT
protocols such as MQTT. By enabling device owners to change
factory deployed keys, this approach helps to increase trust
in publishing manufacturing relevant confidential data to the
Internet. Using NFC technology to transfer keys is intuitive
and offers security advantages compared to other wireless
technologies. The proposed BYOK hardware extension allows
keys to be deployed using NFC in a secured manner, even
if the manufacturing device is without a power supply. We
have shown a prototype that highlights the functionality and
feasibility of our approach. The presented approach is also
shown to be secured against issues that would arise due to
including an additional interface into manufacturing devices.
As future work we plan to extend our approach to not
only support key material but arbitrary configuration data. As
deploying malicious configuration data could lead to physical
damage or even threaten human lives, security of transferred
configuration data needs to be further improved compared to
our current approach.
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